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Balancing Democracy with Power:
Responsibility, Order, and Justice in
Reinhold Niebuhr’s World View,
1940–1949

Andrew C. Ulrich
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Abstract
From the moment Reinhold Niebuhr heard of the events at Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941, he immediately began imagining American involvement in
the peace that would follow Allied victory over the Axis powers. Arguably the
most prominent Protestant theologian in the twentieth century, Niebuhr developed an intriguing view of the international system in the 1940s. Niebuhr believed it was America’s responsibility to champion a world order or community
that would defend and promote justice in the face of tyranny. For justice to exist,
order was necessary and democracy was the best way to promote world order,
but not the only way. He also realized that “power” in the international system
also aﬀected global order. To him, the world could not solve global problems
through an ideal system of international law, nor did he think that the possibility of world organization was purely a question of the manipulation of power. By
understanding that a balance between a democratic world order and one based
upon preponderant power was necessary, Niebuhr identiﬁed with both realist
and idealist. The 1940s was the testing ground that would continue to shape and
aﬀect his views of the international system. How did Reinhold Niebuhr believe
the world could make the transition from war to peace in the 1940s? This pivotal decade for the United States in the twentieth century was indeed central to
Niebuhr’s evolving world view that a global order, balancing the use of or willingness to use power (whether political, economic, or military) with a democratic based system, would bring about a just peace.
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The relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States,
both emerging world powers, became Niebuhr’s focus during the
1940s. As the war continued into the decade, Niebuhr realized that
the Americans and Russians would emerge from the Second World
War as the most powerful nations, and that any future world order
would need the involvement of both to succeed. Yet as the war ended, the relationship between the two powers appeared to be an obstacle to the peace. Niebuhr believed that the two had to come to some
understanding over the basis of world order. A democratically based
world order was unlikely with a Stalinist Russia. Although a dictatorship, the Americans and their allies had things they could learn
from the Soviets, which were necessary for a successful world order –
among their willingness to use power to obtain their goals. In order
to have peace, Niebuhr said that the democratic powers had to combine the development and use of power with democratic means in order to create a world order that would bring about peace and justice.
What follows is an account of Reinhold Niebuhr’s thoughts
on human nature and their application to the realm of international relations during the 1940s. Many works exist dealing with
Niebuhr’s life. Among them are Ronald Stone’s Reinhold Niebuhr:
Prophet to Politicians and Paul Merkley’s Reinhold Niebuhr: A Political Account. Both authors deal mostly with Niebuhr’s political interests and career, and the connection between his political
view and theology. However, each tends to stress his role in the
Cold War to the exclusion of World War II. Other scholars such
as Landon Gilkey, Robin W. Lovin, and Gordon Harland, among
many others, focus on Niebuhr’s theology without eﬀectively ﬁtting his thought into a broader historical context. Three books in
particular, are more successful in combining Niebuhr’s political
and religious life. The ﬁrst is an edited work by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social,
and Political Thought. Kegley and Bretall’s collection is indispensable, as is Richard Wightman Fox’s Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography
and Henry B. Clark’s Serenity, Courage, and Wisdom: The Enduring Legacy of Reinhold Niebuhr. All three works give substantial
insight into the connections between Niebuhr’s theology and pol-

“The world community, toward which all historical forces seem to be driving us, is mankind’s ﬁnal possibility and
impossibility.”1

“We can save man from another holocaust only if our nerves
are steady and if our moral purpose is matched by strategic
shrewdness.”2
Reinhold Niebuhr

From the moment Reinhold Niebuhr heard of the events at Pearl
Harbor, he immediately began imagining American involvement in
the peace that would follow Allied victory over the Axis powers. Arguably the most prominent Protestant theologian in the twentieth
century, Niebuhr developed an intriguing view of the international
system in the 1940s. Niebuhr based his view of international relations
upon the idea that American responsibility in the world was to champion a world order or community that would defend and promote
justice in the face of tyranny. For justice to exist, order was necessary. For Niebuhr, democracy was the best way to promote world order, but not the only way. He also realized that “power” in the international system also aﬀected global order. Therefore, the United States
needed to ﬁnd a balance between a democratic world order and order based upon preponderant power. He identiﬁed with both realists
and idealists, ﬁnding a central position between the two schools of
thought. To him, the world could not solve global problems through
an ideal system of international law, nor did he think that the possibility of world organization was purely a question of the manipulation of power. The 1940s was the testing ground that would continue
to shape and aﬀect his views of the international system.
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itics. What is missing in these works is a focused study of Reinhold Niebuhr’s thoughts on world order or world community in
the 1940s. How did Reinhold Niebuhr believe the world could
make the transition from war to peace in the 1940s? This pivotal decade for the United States in the twentieth century was indeed central to Niebuhr’s evolving world view that a global order,
balancing power (whether political, economic, or military) with a
democratic based system, would bring about a just peace.3
To truly understand Niebuhr’s positions, a brief background is
necessary. His early childhood, adolescence, and adulthood developed his thoughts into the 1940s. Among the most inﬂuential aspects in his life were his religious background, intellectual development at Yale Divinity School and Union Theological Seminary, and
his political activity in the 1930s and 1940s.
Born in 1892, Reinhold Niebuhr was the son of Gustav Niebuhr,
a German immigrant and pastor of the German Evangelical Church
in Webster, Missouri. Reinhold was not the eldest child, but he was
certainly the favorite son. Gustav often invited Reinhold to share in
his intellectual life and follow in his footsteps. In imitating his father,
he enrolled in Eden Theological seminary to become a pastor in the
German Evangelical Church. Along with this weighty expectation,
his father began to see Reinhold as the future head of the household
– the one to look after his mother and sister should his father pass
away. Gustav was both liberal and evangelical in his faith, adhering
to the Social Gospel. He was unconcerned with doctrinal precision,
and believed that not everything in the Bible was literally true. Reinhold strove to imitate his father in these respects. 4
Although Reinhold wished to become more like his father, the
younger Niebuhr struggled with his own identity as a GermanAmerican. He spoke both German and English, but strove to make
himself more American – so he decided to go to Yale Divinity School,
hoping to become a pastor like his father, but also looking for an experience that would help him assimilate into American culture.
Because his father had put much expectation upon Reinhold to
succeed, Niebuhr emerged into manhood with a strict sense of duty,
honor, responsibility, and commitment to hard work. The qualities

Gustav instilled in Reinhold manifested themselves while Reinhold attended Yale Divinity School from 1913–1915. At Yale he
began to both emulate his father intellectually as well as attempting to become more American rather than German American. It
was at Yale that Reinhold decided to master the English language
and make it his primary language of communication for the rest of
his life. During his time at Yale he also began his ﬁrst attempts at
writing for national periodicals. In 1913, Gustav passed away and
Reinhold came to see his own life as a completion of his father’s.
As he continued his education, he immersed himself in the prevailing currents of American intellectual thought, as well as continuing to adhere to his father’s liberal and progressive ideas.5
Upon leaving Yale, Niebuhr accepted a pastorate at Bethel Evangelical Church in Detroit in 1915. Because his messages challenged
his parishioners to actively think about their faith, Niebuhr gained almost immediate notoriety in American religious circles, and began to
accumulate abundant experience dealing with political leaders, business leaders, labor union oﬃcials, and ecclesiastical policymakers. He
also began to travel throughout the US on lecture tours in connection with European seminars organized and funded by the wealthy
Protestant leader, Sherwood Eddy. During these lecture circuits he
met many inﬂuential political and religious leaders, and gained the
patronage of Eddy who would be inﬂuential in getting him a position at Union Theological Seminary in 1928. The period from 1915
to 1928 in Detroit is marked by an outpouring of articles in both religious and secular journals. Also during these years, Reinhold involved
himself in many diﬀerent organizations and political movements –
including the Socialist Party – which gave him leadership experience
and honed his organizational skills. While in Detroit, Niebuhr thus
broadened his thinking and met many inﬂuential ﬁgures.
Although Niebuhr identiﬁed himself with many of President
Woodrow Wilson’s ideals during World War I, a trip to the occupied Ruhr in 1923 changed his outlook. He became skeptical
of wars fought for liberal ideals, because of the France’s harsh, revenge-like policies in the Ruhr. His trip through the area caused
him to reject war and embrace paciﬁsm. Yet Niebuhr never saw
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himself as a “good” paciﬁst. He always stressed his reservations
about paciﬁsm, even while declaring the illegality of war. He criticized those who were naïve in stressing the use of reasonableness
and goodwill as strategies in working for peaceful settlement and
repudiated these as means for establishing world order. He believed that paciﬁsm and paciﬁsts were ignorant of the structures
of international power and the way these worked on a global scale.
Although he was no longer as committed to the idealists’ means
and goals, he still believed humankind should strive for them even
though they were unrealistic.6
Until the 1930s, Niebuhr continued to hold on to a slipping adherence to Social Gospel idealism and socialism, but never completely abandoned either. While at the Union Theological Seminary
in the late 1920s and 1930s as a Professor in Applied Christianity,
his thoughts on human nature and world view ﬂourished. As with
his views on paciﬁsm, his adherence to Social Gospel idealism and
socialism also began to change. As he had chastised the paciﬁsts,
Niebuhr argued that the goals of these liberal movements were utopian, naïve, and overly idealistic. Just as he was never a “good” paciﬁst, he was never a “good” Social Gospel idealist or socialist. After
witnessing labor disputes while living in Detroit, Niebuhr increasingly saw that humans would not always act selﬂessly or morally.
People would act selﬁshly and the kingdom of God or utopia could
not be created in this world, yet at the same time he knew that there
was goodness in the human race, and believed that humans, although
immoral at times, should strive to act morally in the face of immorality. Humans should strive to make the world better even though
it may not lead to anything better. “Moral man” fought for justice
in the world, used as little violence as possible, and conscientiously
humbled himself along the way. A moral man also should not shrink
from responsibility. The responsible man should struggle for justice
although nothing may come of it. A moral man had to work within
the morally ambiguous power structures of society, developing and
using countervailing power when necessary to bring about justice.
This marked Niebuhr’s turn away from idealism, towards a more idealistic realism – often termed “Christian realism” – the use of force

and even violence if necessary in the battle for justice, striving to be
democratic whenever possible, but non-democratic whenever necessary. 7 Niebuhr’s ideas on humankind transferred easily to his views
of international relations during the 1940s.
How did this all ﬁt into Niebuhr’s thoughts during the 1930s and
1940s? The mid 1930s to the 1940s marked an increased preoccupation with international relations for Reinhold Niebuhr. As he developed his brand of idealistic realism that stemmed from events in both
Europe and Asia in the 1930s, Niebuhr began to apply his view of
humankind towards the international system. Not only did Niebuhr
focus on theological issues which he applied to the realm of international politics in books such as Christianity and Power Politics, The
Nature and Destiny of Man, and The Children of Light and the Children
of Darkness, but he established two journals that dealt with Christianity and international aﬀairs, Christianity and Crisis (1939) and Christianity and Society (1940). As an editor of both periodicals, Niebuhr’s
ideas and arguments reached numerous subscribers, among them fellow Christians, government oﬃcials, and the interested public. This
proliﬁc writing during the 1940s is a window into the development
of Niebuhr’s thought on the transition from war to peace.
Niebuhr’s idealistic realism/Christian realism became a tool
through which to critique and resist fascism and shore up struggling “bourgeois” democracies as stated in his work Christianity and
Power Politics (1940). He wished to defend the relative justice of a
bourgeois society against the “barbarians” in the international arena. When war began in Europe in 1939, Niebuhr called for all aid
to the Allies short of war. He did not yet believe that the US should
use violence or that it was American responsibility to be militarily involved in the war. Violence, he believed, should be used only
when it was necessary, yet he did not believe it so at that point. But
at the same time, he said that war against Germany might be necessary to help common civilization – meaning democratic Europe. He
spoke out against staunch paciﬁsts, saying that true Christian love
was not the avoidance of war but responsibility towards others in
need. Therefore, American responsibility was to help the beleaguered
“democratic” nations of Europe against the Axis.8
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Along with his own works, whether books or articles in his own
journals or other national publications, Niebuhr also helped create the Union for Democratic Action (UDA) to gain support of
the non-communist left for President Franklin Roosevelt’s policies.
Above all, Niebuhr hoped to fulﬁll American responsibility towards
the British in particular. In 1941, the UDA lent support for Lend
Lease and protection of Lend Lease shipping. Above all, the UDA
promoted the idea that Americans owed something to common civilizations – in Niebuhr’s thinking, a moral commitment to liberate
Europe from oppression. He began to promote the idea that Americans must take responsibility for future world order.9
Niebuhr did not have to wait long for the United States to become directly involved in Europe, and by the end of 1941, Niebuhr
preoccupied himself with imagining the peace. Those who had superior power would have great responsibility and alone could enact the
peace. Idealists were wrong in believing that the moral course was
to surrender excess power and to seek equal participation by all in a
world government. Balance of power realists also erred in believing in
tossing out the idea of a world government and that the world would
be better ordered with a perpetual standoﬀ between power blocs.
Niebuhr suggested a middle ground between the idealists and realists
– the Soviets, Americans, and British could share world leadership.
Each of the three would limit each other as separate power blocs.
Smaller nations would also be brought into the councils of the three.
Thus realism would be tempered with a touch of Wilsonian idealism
– big power responsibility would be balanced by small power rights.
Separately idealism and realism would not work because “the idealists at their worst imagine that an ideal system of international law
would solve the international problem….The realists understand that
the organization of the world is, as every political problem, a question of the manipulation of power.” Therefore he believed that “If we
are to have a decent peace, we must learn to combine the insights of
the realists and the idealists. The problem is more diﬃcult than the
idealists imagine. But it is not as insoluble as the realists claim.”10 As
the war progressed, Niebuhr began to worry about the US and USSR
being involved in the peace. As the two most powerful nations, he

believed they had the responsibility to be involved in the world system, but was afraid that they were adolescent and “unpredictable giants.” Therefore the British as the mature and stable power would be
the broker between the up and coming world powers.11
According to Niebuhr, two characteristics were necessary for a lasting peace. One was the creation of a durable world order, while the
other was the development of justice (according to Niebuhr, the possibility of equality or mutual love amongst people, or in this instance,
nations) within the new system. Order would come about through
the organization and use of preponderant power by the great powers.
Justice, on the other hand, would come about only if the great powers set up constitutional instruments to guarantee the weaker nations
their just or equal rights. Niebuhr believed the prospect of achieving order was likely, but there was little prospect that justice would
or could be achieved through constitutional arrangements because of
the ideological diﬀerences between the West and the Soviets.12
However, the establishment of a workable world order was not
as easy as Niebuhr had earlier described. As a wartime alliance,
the United Nations was in early 1943, “little more than a concept
and…not politically implemented.” In addition, Niebuhr continued, “a more stable world community is not possible if the lessons
of the war are disregarded.” Those lessons were responsibility in the
world and the necessity and possibility of common action among the
great powers. To become a stable and powerful world community,
the United Nations needed organization that kept in mind the lessons of war and could not be a mere balance of power or a federation
of states, it needed to be somewhere in between. The United Nations would keep each of the four powers in check – it would prevent
an Anglo-American, Russian, or Chinese domination of the world
community, but at the time being there was nothing within the system that would bring justice to the weaker nations.13
Key to the development of a stable world order, according to
Niebuhr, would be American use of power. First of all, Niebuhr
was concerned with America’s aversion towards political or military intervention on the international stage. The United States had
to deﬁne its responsibilities within the international community. He
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warned, “if the impulse of isolationism should overwhelm this nation the second time, we will become the chief instruments of world
anarchy.” The United States needed to be steadfast in its international stance and embrace its responsibility as a great power.14
America needed not only to use its power but use it responsibly –
concerning itself with order and justice. Order would come through
the organization of preponderant power among the great powers
(of which the US would be one), because there was no other way of
overcoming the anarchy of nationalist impulses. He believed justice
could be achieved within this system if one of the great powers had
the conscience and imagination to establish a constitutional system,
which would protect weaker nations’ rights. American-style democracy would be the best way to keep power in check and promote justice.
Yet the problem arose over the nature of constitutional instruments,
since American brand democracy would not be acceptable to all, particularly the Soviet Union. Because of this diﬀerence, there would
be little chance of agreement over how the world would be ordered.
Niebuhr was also concerned over both Russian territorial domination in Eastern Europe and American piosity.15 Niebuhr listed Russian policy as “the desire to establish Russian security and power” and
American policy as “full of Christian and liberal universalism.”16
Because Soviet and American policies seemed incompatible,
Niebuhr began to wonder whether an overall agreement on postwar
policies between the wartime allies could happen. The question was,
“what kind of comradeship [could] be established after the war [was]
over?” To answer his own question, Niebuhr replied, “we share neither
the fears of those who believe that there is no possibility of working
out an accord between Russia and the western world, nor the hopes of
those who think the diﬀerence between us and Russia is a very slight
one and that historical forces will soon overcome it.” Realizing that
throughout history nations of varying cultures learned to live together, Niebuhr said that the Americans and Soviets had to come to terms
with each other. America would have to deal with nations that were
not democratic in order to establish a workable world order.17
The postwar world would need order, yet there was little prospect of a fully developed world system of constitutional order be-

cause not all nations would be willing to participate in a democratic system that would limit their power. Great powers, even those
that were democratic, showed little inclination to delegate their
authority to a world government. To Niebuhr, it appeared that a
successful world system would be unlikely with “the inclination of
Russia to seek security by territorial arrangements in the area contiguous to it, and…the inclination of America to exploit its dominant power, as the strongest industrial nation of the world, in an
eﬀort to win security by itself.”18 There seemed to be little chance
of agreement between the great powers.
Although he knew there was still much to overcome, Niebuhr
became more optimistic in the chances for an agreement on postwar policy between the United States and the Soviet Union after
the October 1943 Moscow Conference. Looking back at the conference, Niebuhr related, “an agreement to discuss basic issues is however something of an achievement in itself, particularly considering the previous tensions between Russia and the western powers.”
What became even more apparent after the conference was how the
powers could organize the European continent so it would become
neither an Anglo-American or Russian colony nor a mere tool in the
combined politics of the great powers. To achieve a positive result,
a European federation of some kind would be integral to the mutual accord among the great powers of Britain, America, and Russia. Any federation would have to draw the nations of continental
Europe into the overall agreement with the great powers that the
British, Americans, and Soviets would hold the eﬀective authority
in world politics. It was obvious to Niebuhr that this would be a way
to fulﬁll his earlier vision of great power responsibility in maintaining world order balanced by small power rights. Therefore the future
world order would combine the insights of the realists with those
of the idealists. He knew the answer to the problem was to “have
more ‘constitutional’ features than a mere partnership between the
big powers. What is called for is a synthesis between Woodrow Wilson’s approach and the piece-meal approach to world problems in
which Churchill and Roosevelt seem to be engaged.” Therefore power would be combined with democracy for a just world order.19
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By 1944 Niebuhr was not quite a household name, but he was a
growing presence in intellectual debate and a popular orator at college campuses across the nation especially after his book, The Children of Light and Children of Darkness, which built upon his earlier
work The Nature and Destiny of Man and his articles from the early
1940s. In The Nature and Destiny of Man, Niebuhr looked at the paradoxical nature of man as sinner and as image of God which led him
in The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness to see democracy as a valuable political instrument. In his thinking, “Man’s capacity
for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary.” He continued to argue that bourgeois society had created democracy as a political tool, but had underestimated the power of self-interest which would lead to injustice.
Thus, democracy would be a necessary part of any future world order
so as to promote a just peace.20
Yet the future order would need more than just democracy to
work. Niebuhr said there was much to learn from the fascists and
Stalinists – “the children of light must be armed with the wisdom
of the children of darkness but must remain free from their malice.” The children of darkness – the fascists and Stalinists had been
more realistic in their view of human existence than the children
of light. The children of light needed to adopt the children of darkness’ shrewdness, while retaining their own moral purpose and openness. He believed that the marketplace of ideas in an open society
or democracy would discourage the self-interested. Democracy was
built on men’s virtues while protecting against their vices – in other
words, democracy acted as “checks and balances” between the good
and evil within society. Reinhold thus was concerned about the apparent injustice of the world at war. Niebuhr warns the “Children
of Light” from believing that they possess superior virtue (Democracy) to those against which they are arrayed. He believed that human beings needed to be realistic - willing to develop and use power,
much like the “children of darkness,” in struggles to promote order
and justice in the world system. Therefore he believed American responsibility could include further violence or use of its power to secure order and justice for the world system. Democracy alone could

not secure world order. Both Democracy and power would be necessary for a just world order.21
When the war ended in Europe in spring 1945, Niebuhr continued his outpouring of ideas on world order. After the San Francisco Conference (April-June 1945), Niebuhr was pleased with the
improved character of the United Nations. The character of the UN
improved since the small nations made themselves heard, gained
considerable rights, and because general public discussion brought a
greater degree of moral idealism into the charter. Yet under the surface of the UN charter, the political realities gave little assurance for
Niebuhr. He believed that the conference “was unable to solve the
main problem which confronted it, which was the establishment of
a genuinely mutual accord between Russia and the west.” The ﬁnal
outcome of the conference was that a system of world security existed on paper but did not hide the fact that the each of the great powers controlled a part of the world under their “sphere of inﬂuence.”
Niebuhr believed, “none of the great powers are quite certain that
one of the other powers may not poach in the preserves assigned to
the other.” Therefore after the conference, at issue was lack of trust
between the Soviets and Americans. Without trust between the two
major powers, the UN as a world government would be a failure.22
Such mistrust soon manifested itself in Niebuhr’s thoughts. By
1946, Niebuhr’s contacts in Germany insisted that the Soviets were
engaged in a systematic eﬀort to impose a Communist regime in
Germany and in the nations of Eastern Europe, and came with
a more dismal view of the Soviets. He began to fear Stalinism as
much as Nazism. He wondered,
What shall we think of Russia? Is this totalitarianism just
like Nazism? Is Russia bent upon expansion and aggression
just like fascism? In answering such questions we must admit that Russian authitarianism has similarities with any
other form of authoritarianism. The lack of freedom in Russia makes it impossible for instance to establish any direct
contact with the common people of Russia and to achieve
a community of mutual trust between them and us, without
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which all constitutional provisions for peace are vain. Furthermore the lack of democratic procedures will make the
Russian domination of Eastern Europe so vexatious that all
sorts of unrest must be expected. But this [unrest] will not
lead to democracy; because the more unpopular the Russians make themselves, the less will they be able to allow
criticism against their rule to be expressed.23

peace in Europe was. According to Niebuhr, the move to aid these
countries was of symbolic signiﬁcance – Americans taking responsibility to bring order and justice to Europe. If it helped bolster the
ﬁght between more democratic sections within Western European
nations against their own communist groups, then he was for it. He
believed that the Russian threat was political rather than military —
namely the creation of Soviet satellites in Western Europe. Niebuhr
held similar ideas to Secretary of State George Marshall and supported the Marshall plan. He believed, “Europe is in dire economic
straits and cannot possibly get on its feet unaided. We cannot avoid
the spread of either economic chaos or of political totalitarianism or
of both (the later being the fruit of the former) if we do not come to
the aid of a European economy which is threatened by complete collapse.” The way to proceed against the Russian political threat was
to make sure that the European economy was not weakened enough
for European citizens to turn towards communism.26
Niebuhr continued to believe that the constitutional world system of the newly chartered United Nations may not work as intended because of the atomic bomb and because of world plurality
or the diﬀerences between the “democracies” and the Soviets. “The
bomb” issue engulfed nations in the hysteria of fear that the world
would “stumble into an atomic war and mutual destruction.” Above
all, the American monopoly on the destructive force aggravated the
already great mistrust between the two powers. Mistrust also developed because not all had the same democracy as the US. Great
powers would not be ready to submit to world authority – did not
want to give up their power to an international body based upon
democratic ideals. Above all the Soviets were not a democracy, but
a dictatorship. He saw that, “no better solution than the division of
Europe into spheres of inﬂuence seems to have been arrived at.”27
In other words, the continent was now “divided” between the west
and the Soviet Union – the UN, as it stood – was a farce.
Niebuhr’s beliefs were echoed by some British. “They would maintain the UN as a bridge with Russia, but they believe that if Russia
refuses to cooperate in an international [system], the United Nations
can serve only very minimal ends.” However, there was minimal hope

Because of Russian domination in Eastern Europe, democracy
would be unlikely to ﬂourish. For this reason, the United Nations
could serve only as a bridge between the Western world and the
Soviet Union and its satellites. In Niebuhr’s eyes, the UN would
not be a successful world government.
Niebuhr did believe that the USSR had rights to security interests and control in Eastern Europe, however the Russians would
not be satisﬁed with a defensive system in Eastern Europe but
wanted control of Europe. They would do so by scaring the West
with threats of war and thus receive concessions. Niebuhr believed
that the way to avoid war that could ensue from Russian threats,
was not to fear it, but at the same to time to be patient. “Under
these circumstances, a policy of yielding would run the risk of resulting in the same consequences which ﬂowed from Mr. Chamberlain’s ill-fated diplomacy. But it must be emphasized that patience is as necessary as ﬁrmness. We must continue to bargain
with the Russians.”24 A way that ﬁrmness and patience could be
combined would be through massive economic aid to Europe.25
In following his thinking on massive economic aid to Europe,
Niebuhr supported President Harry Truman’s appeal to Congress for
$400 million in emergency military and economic aid to Greece and
Turkey. He said that Soviet Communism threatened both “democracies.” It was the United States’ responsibility to aid these beleaguered
democracies. He was a strong supporter since he kept in contact
with many of his European associates which gave him a clearer (or
possibly biased) view of the situation. He believed American moves
were absolutely necessary, although these countries could not really be called democracies. These countries were not at stake, but the
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that if the Western world remained ﬁrm and patient, it would be
possible to change Russian attitudes. According to Niebuhr’s “strategy of patience,” one way to bring this about would be to “stop futile eﬀorts to change what cannot be changed in Eastern Europe,
regarded by Russia as its strategic security belt.” The other related
aspect of this strategy was to realize, “that, while further encroachments of Russia in Western Europe…might mean war, it is also apparent that the eﬀort to keep Russian power in bounds must not be
primarily military. The way to save Western Europe is to give it a
sound economic basis for a sound political life.” Therefore Niebuhr
continued to espouse not only democratic means but the use of power in maintaining order in Europe.28
In the end, Niebuhr believed that the UN, “does not have the
power to establish a stable world order. But it is an important center for the meeting of minds.”29 To Niebuhr, world order was not
a hopeless venture because the UN had failed to establish a stable
global system. He spoke out against those he labeled idealists, saying, “they have wearied us with their constant reiteration that we will
have no civilization at all if we do not achieve a genuine world order.” According to the idealists, the world would not avoid mutual
annihilation unless a successful world government that could bring
all nations under its domination and substitute the system of mutual fear with mutual security. To Niebuhr, the idealists slogan of “one
world or none” was a “foolish slogan” because of “the present impossibility achieving world government.” Likewise he said that the politicians who “are trying to preserve some minimal contact with Russia even while they resist Russian encroachments on the continent
are not as logical as the idealists….But their wisdom, however lowly
and pragmatic, is a better guide out of our chaos, than the wisdom of
the idealist.” His advice was that the United States should not give
in to despair, but to responsibly remain both ﬁrm and patient in the
quest for order and justice in a postwar world, in which there was no
clear road to security or peace.30
In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty appeared to be a radical departure in American foreign policy, yet Niebuhr proclaimed it the
“logical capstone of a policy which has been developing ever since

we emerged from the second (sic) World War as the world’s most
powerful nation.” Speciﬁcally it brought two elements to logical conclusion. The ﬁrst one was that the United States now had a
new sense of responsibility in the world community. It also spelled
out the American nation’s special responsibility to the North Atlantic community, western civilization, or the “democratic world.”
The North Atlantic pact was necessary because, “the present reality is that the United Nations presupposes the unanimity of the
great powers, which does not in fact exist. This great organization
has therefore been reduced to the status of a minimal bridge between East and West.” Although such a function was important, it
was not the original intention of the UN. To Niebuhr, the peace of
the world depended upon the maintenance of preponderant power in the West. The pact was necessary because the Western European nations desired it. The Atlantic treaty was partly designed to
quiet the fear of Soviet occupation of the continent and to prove to
Europe that the United States would do what was necessary to increase their capacity to resist occupation, much as had been done
with the Marshall Plan. Again, the United States had a responsibility, in this case to the “democratic world,” to promote order and
justice in the world. The North Atlantic Pact was the way that the
United States could combine power and democratic means to carry out its responsibility. 31
Yet Niebuhr continued to worry whether it was advisable to organize the west too tightly. At issue was the fragile nature of the minimal bridge between the West and the Soviet Union in the United
Nations. Niebuhr stated, “our recent success with the Berlin airlift
proves how important it is to remain in a bargaining position with
the Russians. The prophets who predicted that our ﬁrmness in regard to Berlin would inevitably end in a shooting war, have been refuted by events. We can still bargain with Russia.” Had the United States not remained ﬁrm or patient they would have lost their
chance to negotiate with the Soviets.32 Although Niebuhr did not
create a world system, he explained why the United Nations failed
as a workable system and why NATO worked as a stable order that
could promote justice for its membership.
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In conclusion, Reinhold Niebuhr developed an intriguing view of
the international system in the 1940s. His views were that American
responsibility was to uphold world order to defend and promote justice. In order to do this, the United States had to take advice from
both realists and idealists to form a new outlook towards establishing a global system by balancing democracy with the use of power.
The 1940s was the test for his emerging theory.
Although Niebuhr envisioned an interesting world view, he was
not the architect of American grand strategy in the 1940s. As one of
the most famous Protestant thinkers of the twentieth century America, Reinhold lived his life in the spotlight, unlike many scholars and
preachers. Thousands discussed and were inﬂuenced by his nationwide
lectures and proliﬁc scholarship. Because of his notoriety, government
policymakers, political ﬁgures, and other national leaders sought
Niebuhr’s guidance. From 1946 on, he had been a member of Council of Foreign Relations and met regularly with the State Department’s Advisory Commission on Cultural Policy in Occupied Territories. He was also invited to join in deliberations of George Kennan’s
Policy Planning Staﬀ in June 1949 for two days. Yet he did not have a
notable impact upon American policy-making in the 1940s.
Although Niebuhr did not create world order, his contribution
was that he explained why the United Nations failed as a workable
system in the 1940s and why NATO worked as a stable community that promoted justice for its membership. He therefore made
suggestions for future reference. By the end of the decade, Niebuhr
saw the failures of the United Nations as a stable world order that
would be able to bring about a just peace. According to Niebuhr,
any successful world order would combine the insights of the realists with that of the idealists. This meant that the United Nations
would need order based upon preponderant power shared among
the great powers. This did not happen because of the failures of
the Western great powers and the Soviet Union to share world
power as ideological diﬀerences developed into mistrust between
the former Allies. Although the United Nations was able to bring
weaker powers into the councils of the great powers, the stronger
nations could not guarantee just rights to the smaller nations. In

the end, the United Nations served as a minimal bridge between
the East and the West. Although this was a good development, it
was not the intended purpose for the UN.
For Niebuhr, American responsibility transferred to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United States would be the great
power that would guarantee the Western Europeans their just rights
in the world system. American power would be combined with a
democratic system to create a workable world order. The alliance
with the Europeans was workable because of a moral consensus –
these nations were “democratic” so it was much easier to come to
an agreement for this reason. NATO would create peace by remaining ﬁrm and patient towards the Soviet Union. The United Nations
would only be the way through which the Soviet Union and the
West could negotiate with each other, while NATO would be the
stable order that would help prevent another war.
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